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Putnam’s formulation (1975) of the no miracle argument, 
and Putnam’s (1978) and Laudan’s (1981) pessimistic meta-
inductive arguments reopened the centuries-old battle over 
scientific realism. Since then, all the theoretical paths in the 
discussion seem to have been explored. The publication, 
almost forty years after the origin of the discussion, of 
Varieties of Scientific Realism, a collection of contributions 
edited by Evandro Agazzi, inevitably raises the question: Is 
the scientific realism debate still alive?
Reviewing a collective work is objectively difficult because 
each of the contributions has its own particular features. In 
the case of Varieties of Scientific Realism, as its title makes 
explicit, the goal is to present a variety of contributions. As 
a consequence, a natural perspective on this book consists 
in raising two questions: Are the past achievements of the 
debate well represented? Are the debate’s present challenges 
and potential developments indicated?
In order to answer both these questions, this review will follow 
the order of the book and end with a general assessment. The 
book comprises four parts: an introduction and prologue; 
a part dealing with general problems and arguments in 
the discussion of scientific realism and antirealism; a part 
discussing and defending “some recent conceptions of 
scientific realism”; and a part concerning realism in particular 
fields or disciplines.
In his contribution “Realism Today: Realism and Objectivity 
in Science”, Mario Alai covers almost every aspect of the 
debate, namely the main arguments and the logical space 
of possible positions. He offers a very useful distinction 
between two debates which tend to be conflated under the 
label of “realism”: the problem of scientific realism and the 
problem of scientific objectivity. These two problems result 
from two very different facts. The question of the knowability 
of unobservable objects follows from the recognition that 
our powers of detection are limited. The question of the 
eliminability of any subjective perspective on the world 
results from the observation that “knowledge is a function of 
two arguments, objective reality and subjective factors which 
precede and ‘shape’ our experience and cognition” (p. 38).
In his book Scientific Objectivity and its Context, published 
in 2014, Evandro Agazzi managed to develop a full theory 
of scientific realism. In the chapter he wrote for Varieties 
of Scientific Realism, “The Truth of Theories and Scientific 
Realism”, he succeeds in presenting in a clear and structured 
way the main tenets of his book. He starts with the recognition 
that, in philosophy of science, objectivity has replaced 
truth as the cardinal value, and objectivity understood as 
intersubjective agreement has replaced objectivity as a 
property of an object. His goal is to reinstate truth as the 
main value of scientific theories, and to derive strong and 
weak objectivity from it. In order to do so, Agazzi (i) proposes 
a useful distinction between “things” and “objects”: objects 
are structured sets of predicates, which are abstracted from 
concrete things; (ii) develops a three-level semantics. Then 
he explains how to understand empirical knowledge and 
theoretical knowledge.
Alan Musgrave is a prominent advocate of scientific realism. 
In a chapter entitled “Strict Empiricism versus Explanation 
in Science”, he presents the debate and defends his own 
position. According to Musgrave, in agreement with Duhem, 
the central contentious point is the place of explanation in 
science. His point of view is that “it is reasonable to believe 
that the best (or only) explanation of certain phenomena 
is true”. This principle is applied at the object level and the 
meta level. At the object level, current scientific theories are 
the best available explanations of phenomena, and hence 
they are true. At the meta level, scientific realism is the best 
explanation for the success of science.  This conclusion is 
supported by two arguments: (i) The negation of this claim 
entails that we cannot explain phenomena, and therefore 
deprives the scientific endeavor of one of its main credentials; 
(ii) a response to Laudan’s pessimistic meta-inductive 
(PMI) argument. Let me briefly recap the PMI: it has often 
happened in the past that empirically successful theories 
were later rejected, so that it is not reasonable to accept 
a theory as true on the grounds of its empirical success. 
Musgrave’s response bears on two conceptual distinctions: 
partial truth vs. verisimilitude; empirical success as verified 
prediction vs. empirical success as novel prediction. With 
both these distinctions, his argument can be understood as 
the application of a two-step strategy: (i) the elimination of 
any theory that was devoid of novel predictions from the list 
of relevant historical cases; (ii) the demonstration that false 
theories that had genuine empirical success were partially 
true.
In general, this paper gives a good overview of the strategy 
commonly used to respond to Laudan’s argument. Also, it 
attempts to link this debate to historical debates, including 
the relationship between science and religion.
Bas van Fraassen’s “Misdirection and Misconception in 
the Scientific Realism Debate” claims that constructive 
empiricism has been misconstrued: it is neither an ontological 
claim nor a polemical claim. The real question is not: “What 
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is there?” but “What is science?” and, more precisely, “What 
are the criteria of adequacy in scientific practice?” The 
ontological interpretation of the debate is rejected because 
factual questions are not philosophical. However, van 
Fraassen does not seem to realize that the question: “What 
are the criteria of adequacy in scientific practice?” is as factual 
as the question about the existence of electrons. He quotes as 
evidence a paper by Patrick Suppe (1998), who studies the 
ways in which scientific papers, de facto, argue.
Van Fraassen claims that one can be an antirealist while 
being gnostic, i.e. believing that scientific theories are 
true. According to Papineau’s definition, used here by van 
Fraassen, the antirealist claims that it is impossible to know 
if theoretical entities exist, while the scientific gnostic thinks 
that our currently accepted theories are true. This analogy 
with religious belief is misguided. A religious believer can be 
gnostic about biblical content while thinking that there is no 
such thing as biblical knowledge. Such an attitude is rationally 
possible because his belief involves belief in a revelation. By 
contrast, if scientific knowledge is impossible, theories are 
arbitrary. Except in the case of someone who reduces the 
criteria of rationality to those of logical possibilities, such a 
position appears to be inconsistent.
Van Fraassen misrepresents the ontological realist’s claim. 
The ontological realist does not automatically endorse the 
existence of unobservable entities. This commitment is 
the consequence of the association of an epistemological 
claim (which is philosophical) and a mix of empirical 
claims (experimental, historical, and sociological). The first 
proposition has the following form: “If the conditions C
1
... 
C
n
 are met, scientists know the existence and the nature 
of the unobservable entities their theories describe”. The 
second proposition asserts that the conditions C
1
...C
n
 are 
actually met. Add the principle of factivity of knowledge 
(i.e. the knowledge that p entails p), and one cannot support 
epistemological realism and deny ontological realism.
It is because of his epistemology that van Fraassen does not 
admit a link between an ascription of a justified belief and the 
assertion of the existence of the truthmakers of the belief. Van 
Fraassen (1989) holds that any belief which is not irrational 
is rational. He thereby blurs the boundary, on the one hand, 
between what is rational and what is “arational” and, on 
the other, between what is rationally required and what is 
rationally permitted. The most important consequence of this 
move is that two opposite decisions can be equally rational.
Van Fraassen uses his epistemological theory to discard the 
view that inferences to the best explanation are necessary 
conditions for the rationality of theory acceptances. He 
admits that it is rational to accept the best explanation of a 
known fact. But his idiosyncratic epistemology enables him 
to deny that it is irrational to accept an explanation other 
than the best.
In “Scientific Realism: Representation, Objectivity and Truth”, 
Michel Ghins first defends semantic realism and then sets 
out to support his own version of epistemic scientific realism. 
However, he refuses to use “wholesale” realism (Magnus 
and Callender 2004) or “recipe-realism” (Saatsi 2016), and 
in particular he refuses to use the no miracle argument. If 
scientific realism is defined as the identification of the good 
reasons (or arguments) scientists have for accepting the truth 
of current scientific theories, “the challenge for the realist is to 
formulate criteria for selecting objects posited by our theories 
which deserve to be called ‘real’” (p. 119). Once these good 
reasons are identified, the task is to determine what parts of 
our theories are justified by these reasons.
The central question any endeavor of this kind raises is that 
of the justification of the justification criteria. Are there good 
reasons for believing that a given reason is a good reason? 
Ghins solves this problem with the help of two different 
facts. First, he draws on a historical case of a successful 
argumentation for the existence of unobservable objects, 
namely Perrin’s famous case for the existence of atoms. 
He abstracts from this case four general requirements for 
arguments. Second,  Ghins derives from semantic realism 
the impossibility of believing in the infallibility of current 
scientific theories: no mental content, even the best reason, 
is infallibly correlated with truth, since truth is an absolute 
property of a statement.
In a chapter entitled “Robustness and Scientific Realism”, 
Marco Buzzoni’s starting point is the lack of cogency of Smart’s 
cosmic coincidence argument, even in Putnam’s (1975) 
and Hacking’s (1983) reworked versions. He also follows 
Woodward’s (2006) recommendation to distinguish between 
different concepts of robustness. Buzzoni contends that, in 
order to make Smart’s cosmic argument work, one has to 
avoid “the opposite error of neglecting important similarities 
between these different kinds of robustness” (pp. 139-140). 
He shows that robustness as consilience and robustness as 
stability should be understood as interdependent.
The form of Thomas Nickles’ paper, “Cognitive Illusions and 
Nonrealism: Objections and Replies”, is an interview with the 
author by himself about his own views on scientific realism, 
namely non-realism and cognitive illusions. However, it 
is difficult to grasp the originality of his view. Substituting 
the label “antirealism”  for “nonrealism” is only a verbal 
move, since their definitions are identical. According to the 
author, “[w]hen it comes to deep, postulatory theories, I 
am a nonrealist. I deny that we have sufficient evidence and 
argument to conclude with confidence that even our most 
mature theories are true, or very nearly” (p. 151); this is 
nothing other than epistemic antirealism. As for “cognitive 
illusions”, this is nothing more nor less than a reformulation 
of what could be called the Pyrrhonian version of the 
pessimistic induction argument (Künstler 2012; Wray 2012).
Instead of dealing directly with the scientific realism debate, 
Fabio Minazzi’s contribution “The Epistemological Problem 
of the Objectivity of Knowledge” grapples with the general 
problem of defining objectivity. Following the historical 
order, the author recapitulates different solutions that have 
been offered to this problem, from Kant to Preti’s neo-realism.
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Gerhard Vollmer, in a chapter entitled “Why Do Theories 
Fail?”, sets out to present “the best argument for realism”. 
In a nutshell, he argues that only realism can explain why 
scientific theories fail. The premises of his argument are:
(1) A true theory cannot fail (i.e. be rejected).
(2) Anti-realism does not explain why theories fail.
(2a) Anti-realists do not talk about it.
(2b) Anti-realists cannot explain it.
The problem with Vollmer’s argument is that both these 
premises are false. (1) A true theory can fail and be rejected 
for a long time by the scientific community (e.g. Copernicus’s 
theory, Mendel’s theory, Wegener’s atomist theory, Darwin’s 
theory). This is possible because a scientific theory cannot 
be applied to phenomena without auxiliary hypotheses and 
models.
(2a) Vollmer wonders why antirealists wonder “why did 
Putnam, van Fraassen and most other realists (sic) put up with 
the success of realistic hypotheses, theories and so instead of 
referring to their failures?” Since Laudan’s paper, most of the 
literature has been devoted to precisely this problem. Even 
Poincaré and Duhem have tried to give a response to it.
(2b) Anti-realists do provide explanations for the failure of 
theories. For instance, it is often claimed that the explanation 
for the failure of a theory is that it postulated entities whose 
existence was not empirically grounded, which were used 
to make empirical predictions. Another explanation is that 
a theory is not empirically adequate. The motivation for 
accepting a theory is only its ability to derive true empirical 
regularities. Often a theory predicts unobserved empirical 
regularities. Thus, if these predictions turn out to be false, the 
theory should be rejected. Scientific anti-realists accept the 
existence and knowability of empirical regularities, since they 
do not reject empirical knowledge.
The failure of Vollmer’s argument springs from confusion 
as to what scientific realism is. He distinguishes between 
three varieties of realism: ontological, epistemological and 
methodological, and yet he discusses these varieties without 
taking this distinction into account. For instance, it is unclear 
whether his best argument is for ontological, epistemological 
or methodological realism. The fact that past theories were 
rejected might be a reason to believe in a mind-independent 
reality, but this consideration is not an argument for 
“methodological realism”. On the contrary, the author seems 
to ignore the fact that the most important of the antirealists’ 
arguments draws on the fact of past failures of science in 
order to cast doubt on current scientific theories.
In a chapter entitled “Scientific Realism and the Mind-
Independence of the World”, Stathis Psillos does not, 
surprisingly, deal with the epistemological claim of 
scientific realism, as he did in his previous work, but with 
its metaphysical claim that: “The world has a definite and 
mind-independent structure” (p. 209). He has previously put 
forward the defence that this claim should be understood as 
licensing “the possibility of a gap between what there is in the 
world and what is issued (...) as existing by a suitable (even 
ideal) set of epistemic practices and conditions” (p. 210). He 
contends that neither idealism nor verificationism allows 
for this “possibility of divergence”. He therefore adds two 
necessary conditions for mind independence: “irreducible 
existence”, in order to exclude idealism, and “objective 
existence”, in order to exclude verificationism.
Steven French’s “Structural Realism and the Toolbox of 
Metaphysics” is a response to Saatsi’s (2016) charge against 
what he calls “recipe realism”. First, let me outline Saatsi’s 
claim in order to contextualize French’s response. “Recipe 
realism” aims to find a procedure, applicable to any scientific 
theory, which can identify the epistemologically safe parts of 
those theories. Saatsi offers three main arguments to support 
his criticism: (non-projectibility) “recipe realism” inductively 
justifies its algorithms by blindly treating scientific theories 
as homogeneous; (relativism) there are many contradictory 
versions of such recipes; (non-informativity) the recipes 
do not help us to know what theories say about reality. He 
contends that “recipe realism” should be replaced by an 
“exemplar-driven realism”, conceived as a “positive attitude” 
which, in every case of theoretical change, searches for 
invariant elements whose presence explains the experimental 
successes of the discarded theory.
French agrees with Saatsi’s rejection of “recipe realism”, but 
he denies that such rejection implies renouncing structural 
realism. In order to rebut this implication, he tries to show 
that structural realism should be seen as an item belonging 
to exemplar-driven realism. Scientific realism avoids the 
non-projectibility objection, since it is a theory about the 
theoretical content of quantum theory, quantum field theory 
and high-energy physics, which are all related. The structural 
realist avoids the relativism objection, since formal tools 
(Ramsey sentences, set theory or category theory) are only 
tools of representation. The non-informativeness objection 
is blocked by the fact that, for each theory, the notion of 
structure is introduced for specific reasons: the problem 
of underdetermination in the case of quantum physics; 
Poincaré’s symmetry in that of quantum field theory.
French goes further than Saatsi. The exemplar-driven 
approach is exposed to the danger of being redundant 
by comparison with a plain scientific evaluation or the 
historiographical reconstruction of theories. Why is this 
approach still a philosophical approach? According to 
French, the philosopher’s task is to ascertain the metaphysical 
implications of these theories. How can metaphysics help to 
understand science? French identifies three options: science 
replaces metaphysics, metaphysics replicates scientific 
notions, or metaphysics is a toolbox to understand science. 
He advocates this last approach, and gives an illustration by 
discussing how the structural view can be cashed out in terms 
of the classical determinable/determinate distinction or in 
terms of Paul’s (2012) “mereological bundle theory”.
Although it only appears in the fourth section of the book, 
Amparo Gómez’s paper, “Causation and Scientific Realism: 
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Mechanism and Power without Essentialism”, illustrates 
French’s conception of metaphysics as a toolbox. Gómez 
investigates what the metaphysical commitments of a 
scientific realist should be. In particular, she wonders if one 
can accept a dispositional ontology without subscribing to 
essentialism.
In “Retention, Truth-Content and Selective Realism”, Alberto 
Cordero discusses the latest developments in the selectivist 
strategy to undermine the pessimistic meta-induction. 
This strategy goes like this: in order to retain the epistemic 
value of the empirical success of scientific theories in spite 
of the fact that successful theories often fail, the strategy 
sometimes called “divisionism” attempts to distinguish 
between the working posits and the idle posits of these 
theories. This strategy is intuitively appealing. However, 
its accomplishments are quite deceptive. As Vickers (2013) 
writes: “Even if the ‘working posits’ of contemporary science 
cannot be prospectively identified, it remains possible that 
we might develop a recipe for identifying certain idle posits” 
(Vickers 2013, p. 209). This kind of response to the pessimistic 
argument is far from being optimistic. A useful recapitulation 
of the history leading to such a gloomy conclusion enables 
Cordero to identify the cause of this (at least apparent) 
failure in the selectivists’ minimalist constraint. Selectivists 
look for the minimal ontological commitment: they try to 
accept only the theoretical parts that are necessary for the 
derivation of successful empirical predictions. Cordero 
therefore contends that a naturalistic approach to science, 
which applies a scientific criterion of scientific acceptance to 
scientific theories (instead of a philosophical one), justifies 
the adoption of a less drastic ontological diet.
Hans Lenk, in “A Scheme-Interpretationist and Actionistic 
Scientific Realism”, claims that over-determination of our 
experience by what he calls “scheme-interpretation” is 
unavoidable.
The third part of the book sets out to determine how the 
scientific realism debate can be formulated in the context 
of particular sciences: semantics (Jan Woleński), quantum 
mechanics (Dennis Dieks and Roland Omnes), cognitive 
science (Jean-Guy Meunier and Lektorski) and mathematics 
(Gerhard Heinzmann and Reinhard Kahle).
In my opinion, the book holds promise in its overview of 
the “varieties of scientific realism”, its past achievements, 
and its future directions. The organization of the book is 
well thought out and user-friendly. The book is useful for 
newcomers to the field, since it helps to provide a sense of 
the diverse directions of the realism debate. It is also useful 
for researchers, as many of its chapters discuss recent ideas 
in realism and provide a new impetus for further discussion.
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